The Long Arm of Nursultan Nazarbayev
- centralasiareview
- Dec 5, 2019
- 6 min read
Updated: Dec 12, 2019
What does the case of Mukhtar Ablyazov tell us about how Nazarbayev, globalisation and patronage networks are shaping modern Kazakhstan?
Kazakhstan’s development over the past 30 years has been transformative. The oil rich state has become an international force, heading the OSCE and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, receiving huge amounts of investment and aggressively exporting sport and academia (Fauve, 2015). Yet the real picture is a more complex one, with an effective one party state that uses its integration into international institutions to maintain its power and pursue dissidents. As Kazakhstan enters a period of uncertainty, with the balance of power between Ex-President Nazarbayev and new President Tokayev yet to be determined, understanding what constitutes power in the Central Asian state and how this power is maintained through global links is vital.
In 1991, as the seemingly immutable Soviet Union took the world by surprise as it folded in on itself with states as diverse as Latvia, Georgia and Kazakhstan finding themselves in control of their own political destiny. Whilst the origins of the USSR’s collapse are hotly contested, political divergence had been happening as early as 1986 under Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika. Each country has its own example of when revolution was made more likely, if not inevitable. In East Germany, as horrified Soviet officials looked on as the Berlin Wall was dismembered brick by brick, the muted response from Moscow amounted to permission. In Estonia it was the ‘singing revolution’ that marked their departure. The picture emerging from Kazakhstan was, however, a complex one. One of the first Soviet states to ‘rattle the Soviet cage’, the protests of 1986, dubbed ‘Zheltoksan’ (Kazakh for December) marked for many the demise of Moscow rule. Yet the protests were violently repressed, and many of the repressors remained in Government long after Kazakhstan’s independence.
As communism in Kazakhstan crumbled it revealed a new political identity, inescapably tied to the country’s history. According to Kathleen Collins, the clan became the ‘critical unit of analysis’ (2003) and the functions once embodied by the communist regime – welfare, jobs, the social sphere – became dependent on kinship ties. Despite a brief period of political plurality, non-democratic rule continued and Nursultan Nazarbayev, the republic’s Prime Minister in 1986, remained at the head of an increasingly powerful regime until March this year.
Nazarbayev relied on many of these informal clan political practices to maintain his power. Nazarbayev’s initial economic reforms were met with resistance from both Parliament and the Supreme Court yet such institutional obstacles were overcome by establishing patrimonial relationships with the Parliamentary deputies and the executive branch (the status and income of such deputies was controlled by the President) (Isaacs, 2010, 20). A similar story plays out for many aspects of post-transition Kazakhstani politics. Opposition leader Olzhas Suleimenov was given a diplomatic role in Rome to prevent his running for president in 1996. Nazarbayev relied on patronage networks within the judicial system to rewrite the constitution in 1995. Opposition activist Mukhtar Ablyazov identified a similar trend emerging as Nazarbayev amassed control:
‘it was already obvious that the country was retreating very quickly into authoritarianism, and that a clan shape in which people loyal to Nazarbayev were appointed not because of their professional skill but because of personal loyalty' (Lilis, 2019; 41)
Modern Kazakhstan
The case of the now-exiled Ablyazov, once representative of a class of billionaires made unimaginably wealthy by Nazarbayev’s economic reforms, is illustrative of how a state buoyed by oil wealth has begun to rely on informal power structures on an international scale. Ablyazov, born to a modest family in a village near the Russian border, began his business by importing printers and by 1998 had amassed a wealth of $300m, culminating in his part ownership of the BTA bank. Ablyazov claims that Nazarbayev demanded a portion of the company in order to guarantee his loyalty. Ablyazov’s refused to engage with Nazarbayev’s Government (in an official capacity) and instead started to fund the opposition party ‘Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan’, landing him a period in Derzhavinsk, the notorious Kazakhstani prison, in 2003. By 2005, after a personal guarantee to Nazarbayev to stay out of politics, Ablyazov was back in control of BTA.
Yet it wasn’t to last. The 2008 financial crisis revealed that Ablyazov had used a labyrinth of complex financial instruments to embezzle billions of dollars out of the country. Now residing in London Ablyazov has denied these charges, arguing in court
'In Kazakhstan the assets of wealthy individuals such as myself are the threat of unlawful seizure by the authorities… this leads to an almost universal practice among high net worth Kazakhstanis of holding our assets through nominees, both corporate and individual’.
Yet the key element to this is not so much the charges, as Cooley and Heathershaw state ‘nearly every aspect of the Ablyazov case is contested’ (2017; 55), but the influence that the pairs’ relationship had on proceedings. Despite the promise to remain out of politics, once Ablyazov had found asylum in London he began covertly funding an array of political activity in Kazakhstan. It is this betrayal, according to Cooley and Heathershaw, that prompted Nazarbayev to go after Ablyazov so aggressively. The action is not without precedent, other ‘proteges’ of Nazarbayev’s, who’ve gone on to criticise the President, have also felt his acute sense of justice. Galymazhan Zhakiyanov and Altynbek Sarsenbaev, prominent figures who, alongside Ablyazov, got rich as a result of Nazarbayev’s economic liberalisation have ended up imprisoned or dead when they broke ranks with the regime. That a regime which relies so heavily on informal, personalised relationships, often formed through patronage, would punish those who try to undermine the regime should come as no surprise.
Nazarbayev relied on both formal and informal international channels – British courts were used alongside prestigious global investigative firms such as Diligence and Arcanum. The formal process of Interpol Red Notices to track down criminals was used alongside extraordinary renditions of Ablyazov’s family – an event allegedly carried out with the support of Nazarbayev’s close friend, former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Nazarbayev’s attempts to control the narrative around Ablyazov range from the farcical, such as employing British PR firm Portland Communications to edit Ablyazov’s wikipedia page, to the dangerous, such as threatening Canadian Human Rights lawyer Peter Sahlas.
As Nazarbayev’s opposition has spread globally so has his efforts to consolidate power. Much of this relies on PR and investigative firms and is buttressed by Kazakhstan’s increasing presence in international diplomacy.
What does the future hold in store?
On the 19th March 2019 Nazarbayev shocked the world by declaring his resignation and his trusted lieutenant, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, quickly assumed control. The occasion has provided a valuable insight into how politics is conducted behind the façade of formal institutions. Nazarbayev resigned his position as President but maintained his position as ‘Leader of the Nation’ and since March has gradually assumed more of the responsibility that was traditionally the remit of the President. It remains to be seen how these events will play out, Nazarabyev has stated he is not running the country, but also that he will not sit by idly if he doesn’t like the direction of the country.
Nazarbayev’s position, responsibility and power is difficult to pin down, largely because it relies on a broader institutionalisation that is intimately tied to personal, informal links rather than clear rules. So long as Nazarbayev is able to move around pieces on the board to suit his interests, such as selecting the powerful Major-General of National Security, Nazarbayev’s influence still hangs heavy over political proceedings. Globalised links will continue to play a huge role in the forthcoming developments, both in terms of cementing control at home and establishing positions of influence within international frameworks. How this global power grab – reliant on formal institutions such as interpol and the judicial system, alongside [informal example] will interact with Nazarbayev’s own system of patronage will likely be the determining factor for Kazakhstan’s next stage of development.
Bibliography
Collins, K (2003) 'The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia' in Comparative Politics (35:2)
Cooley, A & Heathershaw, J (2017) 'Dictators without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia' (New Haven: Yale University Press)
Fauve, A (2015) ‘Global Astana: nation branding as a legitimisation tool for authoritarian regimes’, in ‘Central Asian Survey, 34:1
Isaacs, R (2010) 'Informal Politics and the Uncertain Context of Transition: Revisiting Early Stage Non-Democratic Transition in Kazakhstan' in Democratisation (17:1)
Lillis, J (2019) ‘Dark Shadows: Inside the Secret World of Kazakhstan’ (London: I.B. Tauris)
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